On October 10, 2026, the South China Morning Post published an opinion piece by Asia Academy of Digital Economics (AADE) President Tan Poh Hwee, who is also a corresponding fellow of the National Academy of Artificial Intelligence, titled "Better protection needed as violent cryptocurrency robberies surge." The commentary argues that cryptocurrency's promise of financial freedom carries a cost the industry must confront: growing wealth can make its owners more attractive targets for violent criminals, and treating the physical safety of holders as a personal matter is an inadequate approach to financial security.
The piece points to the rise in "wrench attacks," in which physical violence or threats are used to force someone to surrender cryptocurrency. A wallet may resist sophisticated hacking while its owner remains vulnerable to coercion. According to the commentary, violent criminals extracted over US$30 million from cryptocurrency holders in the first half of the year; if that pace continues, annual losses could exceed last year's US$58 million. Worldwide, 46 incidents were documented through to late June.
Cases That Reveal the Limits of Digital Security
The commentary cites two recent cases. Last December, masked intruders attacked a cryptocurrency investor at his home in Solihull, England, and threatened his pregnant wife; he transferred cryptocurrency worth hundreds of thousands of pounds during the 45-minute ordeal. In March, Hong Kong SAR police received a report that a man had been assaulted in a Hung Hom hotel and robbed of cryptocurrency worth about HK$5.3 million (US$675,342), with silver worth a further HK$800,000 also reportedly taken.
These cases, the author writes, reveal an uncomfortable limitation of digital security. A transaction system can check whether the required cryptographic authorisation has been supplied, but that does not establish whether the person supplying it is acting freely. Self-custody has genuine benefits, namely direct ownership, portability and reduced dependence on an intermediary, but it also changes who must manage the consequences of coercion. The piece adds that research has identified a correlation between bitcoin prices and reported physical attacks, though correlation alone cannot establish how much of the increase is attributable to price movements, adoption, information exposure or improved reporting, and that the threat can outlast a rally once someone is known, or simply believed, to hold substantial cryptocurrency wealth.
Lessons from Conventional Finance
Conventional finance faces coercion too, the commentary notes, but withdrawal limits, independent approvals, delays and checks for unusual activity can create opportunities for intervention. These arrangements impose costs on legitimate users, yet their protective value deserves recognition when financial products are evaluated primarily for speed and convenience. Advice to avoid publicising wealth can be useful, the author adds, but it cannot substitute for institutional responsibility, since people can be exposed through records they were required to provide or through information they never intended to disclose. Responsibility for violence remains with the perpetrators.
Designing Safeguards and Recognising Their Limits
The industry's response, the piece argues, should address both custody design and the services surrounding it:
- Multiple independent approvals can reduce reliance on a single key or device
- Delayed withdrawals and transaction limits may reduce the amount accessible during a short period of coercion
None of these mechanisms guarantees physical safety; they introduce complexity, and criminals may continue threatening despite technical restrictions. Blockchain records can also help criminal investigations, although traceability does not automatically provide the power to freeze or recover assets. The commentary notes that after the rescue of kidnapped Ledger co-founder David Balland and his partner, French authorities said almost all the cryptocurrency paid as ransom had been traced, frozen and seized, an outcome that depended on investigators, operational intervention and institutional cooperation, showing how the practical protection of digital ownership continues to depend on public systems.
Financial losses capture only part of the harm, the author writes: an unsuccessful extortion attempt can still leave a person injured, a family displaced or a child traumatised. The commentary concludes that security promises should be tested against what happens when a customer is frightened, isolated or protecting a loved one: "A mature financial ecosystem must also give that investor – and the people around them – credible ways to remain safe."